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THE GENEVA CONCLAVE
AND SRI LANKAN GROUND REALITIES By D.B.S.JEYARAJ
The Geneva conclave between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)
and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - facilitated by
Norway with assistance by Switzerland - is over but the shouting
is yet to subside.
If one were to ignore the diversionary post - Geneva cackle and
focus only on the joint statement released by Oslo seven points
are of relevant importance
Firstly there is the joint renewal of an earlier commitment by
the GOSL and LTTE to respect and uphold the ceasefire." The
government and the LTTE are committed to respecting and upholding
the ceasefire agreement, "the statement says.
Secondly there is the joint affirmation of a commitment to
cooperate with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.Both sides "
reconfirmed their commitment to fully cooperate with and respect
the rulings of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, ” the statement
emphasised.
Thirdly there is a joint reiteration of adhering to ceasefire
agreement provisions. The statement notes ” The government and
the LTTE are committed to taking all necessary measures to ensure
that there will be no intimidation, acts of violence, abductions
or killings."
Fourthly the tigers have guaranteed that there would be no
violence against the security forces or police. "The LTTE is
committed to taking all necessary measures to ensure that there
will be no acts of violence against the security forces and the
police" says the statement.
Fifthly the GOSL has guaranteed that no armed group other than
security forces will carry arms or carry out security operations.
"The government is committed to taking all necessary measures in
accordance with the ceasefire agreement to ensure that no armed
group or persons other than government security forces will carry
arms or conduct armed operations." the statement says.
Sixthly both sides have agreed to meet again at the same venue in
two months.The Swiss government will again host the talks. "The
parties requested the Swiss government to host the next round of
talks in Geneva from April 19 to 21 this year.”
Seventhly the SLMM is required to monitor and report on the
implementation of agreements reached at the next round of talks.
"The SLMM will report on the implementation on these agreements
at the next session of talks." the statement observes.
There were discussions on various subjects including child
combatants etc. But as far as the statement goes no new decision
seems to have been arrived at on these matters.. Also there is an
acrimonious debate going on about the status of the original
ceasefire agreement. Were the decisions reached in Geneva
amendments to the ceasefire or not? is the question.
Against the backdrop of earlier post - ceasefire decisions in
Thailand, Norway and Japan not being incoroporated or recognized
as amendments to the ceasefire , whatever decision taken in
Switzerland too cannot be regarded as amendments.If Geneva
decisions are to be elevated to amendment status then all those
earlier ones including the Oslo commitment to explore federalism
should be regarded as amendments too.
Furthermore a close scrutiny of Geneva decisions reveal that
these decisions do not change or transform the original CFA in
any way. There has only been a renewal of commitment to the CFA
and certain provisions. Decisions have been reached to help
implement efficiently some CFA provisions. Guarantees have also
been given to prevent impediments to the CFA recurring. In that
respect the Geneva decisions if implemented on ground will
strengthen the ceasefire.
It must be stressed however that in order to identify
deficiencies in the CFA and its implementation and sugest
remedies a review of the CFA would be necessary. It may not be
comprehensive and deal with only some aspects but nevertheless a
review and reappraisal is necessary . "Strengthening" is possible
only if the existing agreement is examined and weaknesses are
discovered.. To argue therefore that the CFA was not discussed at
all in Geneva is equally facetious as the argument that it was
amended there.
In any case one party to the Geneva confabulations cannot
unilaterally determine whether the CFA was amended or not. Such
conclusions if they are to be binding can only be bilateral and
with the facilitators concurrence. Any one is at liberty to
inform the press or issue press statements about their respective
interpretations but they require acceptance by the other party to
be truly valid.
A case in point is the elaborate charade conducted by Mahinda
Rajapakse's regime prior to the Geneva parley. A massive media
campaign was on to inform the Country that all sorts of issues
were going to be discussed and held training sessions on many
issues. The LTTE kept on repeating that only the issue of
strengthening the ceasefire was on the cards in Geneva.The
Governments "preparations" became redundant when Erik Solheim
delivered a knock - out blow by asserting at commencement that
only the issues about implementing the ceasefire was on the
agenda.
The diversionay debate about the CFA being amended is
superficially "legal" but in reality it is "political". The
Rajapakse regime is caught in a contradiction between precept and
practice. Rajapakse comes to power saying he will replace or
change the ceasefire but goes along with the CFA after assuming
office. This in turn has resulted in puerile exercises to envelop
reality in illusion.
The vulgar build - up to Geneva was one such attempt.Trying to
get the term "ceasefire" instead of " Ceasefire agreement" being
included in the joint statement was another. The post - Geneva
announcement about the CFA being amended is yet one more try to
distort perceptions among his voters and allies.
Legal arguments are being paraded to suit political imperaives.It
appears however that the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and Jathika
Hela Urumaya have not been gullible. Likewise the bulk of
Mahinda's voters too though taken in by his tough posture on the
ceasefire at the Presidential hustings are not likely to be
deceived again.
The single biggest outcome of the Geneva conclave is not what was
mentioned explicitly in the press statement but the implicit
commitment provided by Mahinda Rajapakse that his government
would abide by the ceasefire entered into by the UNF government
with the LTTE. Of course by not attempting to change or replace
it when he was Prime Minister Mahinda accepted the CFA tacitly.
But he could palm "blame" for that on Chandrika.
After Rajapakse became President the buck stopped right at his
desk. With the participation of a GOSL delegation authorised by
Mahinda at the Geneva talks and the so called "consensus" reached
there the new President has demonstrated clearly that he is bound
by and committed to the ceasefire agreement. The "hocus pocus"
prattle about the status of the ceasefire is only a sideshow
stratagem to divert attention away from this salient aspect.
Rajapakse in this is like a magician sidetracking his audience
with a lot of chatter about various things while his deft fingers
suceed in pulling wool collectively over its eyes.
Adhering to the ceasefire under normal circumstances is positive
and not negative. Since Mahinda came to power by describing the
ceasefire as treachery but is now sticking to it he is in a
difficult position.He has to be seen "distancing" himself from
the CFA on the one hand while doing everything possible to keep
it going on the other.
If demonstrating its bona fides to the international community is
of importance to the LTTE the Colombo regime regards the Sri
Lankan people at large as the constituency it needs catering to.
Illustrating this priority vividly was the press - conference
after the sessions. Though there were many representatives of the
International media there was little attempt to address them.
Instead much of the allotted 20 minutes was devoted to statements
in Sinhala and Tamil by Bogollagama and Ashraff for Sri Lankan
TV.
Speakingof Bogollagama reminds one of another media related
matter.Many attempts were made to undermine the LTTE by sections
of the Sri Lankan media while the talks were in progress.Some for
instance whipped themselves up into a frenzy over the LTTE
releasing Balasingham's opening statement to the press. "Foul"
they cried alleging that the LTTE did not play by the accepted
rules. What these rants and raves left unsaid was the explanation
proffered by the LTTE when Oslo raised this issue at the
insistence of Colombo. Balasingham cooly pointed out that it was
Colombo which broke the ground rules first. He referred to the
various media interviews given by Bogollagama the official GOSL
spokesman in Geneva prior to the talks. This was a breach of
etiquette agreed upon the LTTE said. It was this travesty that
necessitated the LTTE releasing its statement unilaterally it was
pinpointed. The end result was the abrupt cancelling of
Bogollagama's "unilateral" press conference on the first day
proving that the LTTE position on this was a valid one.
The GOSL's response to the LTTE releasing its statement by coming
out with its own statement had another consequence. It revealed
that the GOSL stance as articulated by Nimal Siripala de Silva
was that in the eyes of the Rajapakse regime the current
ceasefire was detrimental to national security and sovereignity,
illegal and anti - Constitutional. This revelation was perhaps
the most glaring contradiction of them all.
Here was a Government engaging in talks about strenghening a
ceasefire agreement it described in seriously negative terms.
Even if the decisions reached in Geneva were accepted as
ceasefire amendments those conclusions have little bearing on the
GOSL criticism of the CFA about issues like national security,
sovereignty, legality and Constitutionality.
Thus Rajapakse going along with the CFA is one more instance
where Ranil Wickremasinghe has been proven right on the question
of the ceasefire.. Politically this could be detrimental to
Rajapakse and hence the pathetic attempts to distort reality.
Fortunately for him the UNP instead of exploiting this
opportunity is busily inactive being preoccupied with its own
infighting.
At the inception of the talks Anton Balasingham observed that it
would be better to avoid "acrimonious bickering" in the sessions.
He also reportedly told Govt delegates that it was a political
and not legal forum. Yet the bickering that subsided to the level
of a limited agreement being reached in Geneva has now surfaced
again after the conclave. In spite of the heated exchanges
threatening dire consequences it does not seem likely that the
"amendment" issue would prevent both sides from meeting again in
Geneva during April.
What is likely to affect the fragile relationship however is
failure to honour or implement the decisions reached in Geneva.
Let it not be forgotten that similiar decisions have been reached
in the past too. Erik Solheim says that the outcome in Geneva
exceeded his expectations. May be so. The real test however is
not in arriving at a joint decision but to carry it through. Both
the GOSL and LTTE have claimed that they have scored a victory in
Geneva.
Boasting of success now is premature. Let us not forget that
there is a sense of deja vu in all this. We have passed through
this path before. In fact many, many times. The very fact that
Geneva talks became necessary and required both sides to
reiterate their commitment to what was agreed four years ago is
by itself proof that mere agreements are worthless as the paper
they are written on unless and until they are adhered to
faithfully.
Anton Balasingham addressing the Tamil media claimed it was a
diplomatic victory. In 2002 he said the same thing after the
ceasefire agreement was signed. The statements made after GOSL -
LTTE meetings in Thailand, Norway , Germany and Japan too were
very very optimistic. Yet what happened? After repeated
assertions about significant progress being made at the various
rounds of talks tiger political commissar SP Thamilselvan turned
around and called them a profitless waste of time. Thereafter the
LTTE quit talking saying nothing concrete was being achieved. The
tigers accused the GOSL of not honouring commitments made in the
CFA and at the talks ..
There is very little change in the situation even now. In fact it
has even taken a turn for the worse with the JVP and JHU gaining
more clout with Rajapakse. The new President is also surrounded
with notorious Sinhala hardliners. Against that backdrop one
cannot see certain commitments and obligations being honoured at
all. Take for instance the high security zones. It was not
discussed this time but earlier during Wickremasinghes time some
decisions were arrived at. Yet they were not honoured because the
then Jaffna military commander Sarath Fonseka took a tough line.
That was that. Now the same man is overall army commander. The
writing is on the wall.
It is one thing to agree but entirely a different matter when it
comes to implementation. It is easy to promise but difficult to
deliver. The past experiences and historical memories of the
Tamils can only make them suspicious of easy pledges. There are
many examples of political perfidy in the distant and recent
past.
There has also been the legal dimension. In Sri Lanka there has
been a marked departure from many other countries where the
Judiciary goes the extra male to protect the rights of the
minorities. In Sri Lanka with a few honourable exceptions the
legal system has failed the minorities many times. The
Kodeeswaran case is a notable example.
In recent times too there are many such instances. Bindunuwewa
massacre , Mailanthanai massacre , Trincomalee bus stand statue
incident , bodies floating in Western province waterways etc are
some of these.Another instance is that of the P - TOMS. After
protracted discussions the GOSL and LTTE signed a document to set
up a humanitarian structure to rehabilitate the tsunami victims.
The JVP went to courts and now the P-TOMS is virtually
abandoned.
The International community welcomes Geneva talks. The first
phase was only about the ceasefire. Yet the hope is that both
sides will honour the commitments given and proceed further till
substantive issues of power sharing are discussed. The current
talks are seen as confidence building measures. For these hopes
to be realised there isa preliminary obligation to be fulfilled.
Both sides must honour the guarantees given in Geneva.
What undermines the credibility of these mutual guarantees is the
element of ironic absurdity. The LTTE has been saying that it is
not responsible for the recent violence against the security
forces and Police in the N - E. The tigers say that the people
are on the upsurge and that it is a peoples war. But now the very
same tigers are providing a guarantee that no such attacks will
occur.
On the other hand the GOSL guarantees the disarming of other
armed groups and also prevention of operations. The LTTE has been
accusing the GOSL of backing these groups descibed as "para
military" by the tigers. The GOSL has been denying responsibility
saying these groups are independent functionaries. But now the
same GOSL is guaranteeing the de - fanging of these groups.
What this demonstrates is that both the LTTE and GOSL were being
economical with the truth when they disclaimed total
responsibility for the respective acts of violence perpetrated
against security personnel and tiger cadres.By agreeing to curb
the violence both sides are tacitly admitting that they can
control it. The underlying weakness in this situation is that
both sides are required to control covertly what they have been
denying overtly.
There are also ambiguities in the statement that may be
potentially detrimental in the future. The LTTE is asked to
guarantee that security forces and Police will not be harmed. But
there is no such explicit reference to the members of non - LTTE
groups. The general provisions of the ceasefire are invoked to
cover these elements. Memories are short. These ceasefire
provisions did not prevent the LTTE from unleashing attacks on
these Tamil groups in the past. Without a specific assurance as
in the case of security forces there is no restraint on the LTTE.
In fact if the GOSL does disarm these groups they then become
sitting ducks.
The Geneva statement stipulates that except for GOSL security
personnel no other group will be allowed to carry arms or engage
in armed operations. It is assumed that these provisions apply to
the non - tiger groups alone. Yet there is ambiguity. The status
of the LTTE in this sphere is not specifically outlined. The
disarming clause could be extended to the LTTE also. There is no
explicit reference excluding the LTTE. This could open a
Pandora's box. Already "Col" Karuna is insisting that the LTTE
has to be disarmed and that his men will carry arms as long as
Pirapakaran's men do so.
"Col" Karuna's protest cannot be seen as a maverick, solo
performance. It appears to be more of an orchestrated exercise.It
could be the beginning of a calculated attempt to obstruct the
Geneva decisions being implemented. The inherent weakness in the
agreement reached in Geneva is that the GOSL has promised
something it may not want to deliver. If Colombo does deliver
then Balasingham's claim of a victory may ring true. But the
reality is that this is a pledge Colombo wont or cant deliver. It
is somewhat like the earlier promises on the high security
zones.
The only "successes" the armed forces have been able to achieve
in recent times have been through the manipulation of the so
called Tamil "paramilitary" forces. This is a sad indictment of
the security forces but nevertheless an incontrovertible
fact.Balasingham in his opening statement charged the Government
of aiding and abetting the EPDP, PLOTE, EPRLF, KAruna faction and
a Muslim "Jihad" group. During discussions the political adviser
stated that the ENDLF was also involved. Balasingam grouped the
EPDP, ENDLF and Karuna faction together. He also referred to the
revival of deep penetration squad operations.
The Tamil "paramilitaries" in the East have succeeded in driving
the mainstream LTTE away from GOSL controlled areas. Moreover
Karunas men have penetrated LTTE areas , ambushing and launching
attacks on the LTTE directly. If full scale war erupts the Karuna
cadres will be a great asset to Colombo.Tamil paramilitaries in
the North have killed and abducted over a hundred supporters and
sympathisers of the LTTE. This resulted in over 16,000 tiger
supporters fleeing to the LTTE controlled Wanni. The "peoples
war" of the LTTE was thwarted by these operations. Though
deserving highest condemnation from a human rights perspective
there is no denying that it was this brutal campaign that ended
the so called "peoples war".
Against this backdrop it is highly unlikely to expect the GOSL to
genuinely disarm these groups or completely prevent armed
operations. With the LTTE being untrustworthy and a roused
Sinhala polity influenced by the JVP and JHU the chances of
Karuna or Douglas having their "military wings" clipped seems
impossible. A realistic expectation could be the curbing of these
groups for a period of time. There could be a temporary lull.
Expecting anything further is unlikely because Colombo knows that
the Tamil groups are an asset that it cannot afford to let go
of.
The LTTE however is campaigning excessively on this issue
proclaiming that the Government will de-fang the Tamil groups. If
and when this expectation turns sour the situation would
certainly deteriorate. Violence could recur. The LTTE could also
take the high ground on this because the tigers will initially
honour their commitment. This is due to circumstances. The truth
is that the LTTE sponsored "Tamil resurgent force" violence
petered out because of state - sponsored repression through Tamil
groups. The LTTE was dealt with its own currency. Thus the LTTE
called off its campaign long before Geneva. By agreeing to curb
the violence it has only made a virtue out of necessity.
Given this background it does seem a case of counting chickens
before hatching to claim success in Geneva. Dovish promises by
hawkish entities are uncharacteristic and usually unreliable. The
litmus test will be in genuinely implementing the respective
commitments. The coming weeks before the second round in Geneva
will be a probationary period. According to the statement the
SLMM will be monitoring progress and report on it at the next
session. If significant progress is registered the process could
proceed to the next stage. If developments are negative the
second round of Geneva talks could pave the way for war.If the
assurances given at the first round are flouted constantly a
question mark may loom large over Geneva soon.
(ENDS)
CONCLUDED
DBS Jeyaraj................... Jan 20th 2006
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